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II. STATEMENT OF THE COURTS' JURISDICTION 
This is a domestic law case for which an Appeal lies directly to this court pursuant to 
the provisions of UCA §78-2a-3(2)(h) and (j). The Third District Court entered a final Order 
dismissing the Appellant's Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce on the 1st day of August, 
2001. (Record pp. 148 to 150); (Addendum No. 9). The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal 
to the Utah Supreme Court on the 9th day of August, 2001. (Record pp. 151 to 155); 
(Addendum No. 12). The case was transferred to this court by an Order of the Utah Supreme 
Court which was entered pursuant to Rule 44 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Legal Issues Presented on Appeal: 
1. The ultimate issue to be determined is whether or not the Third District Court 
acted properly in granting the Defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment when it dismissed 
the Appellant's Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 111 to 113). 
2. Whether the Plaintiff s Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce states a prima 
facie cause of action for either: (i) an omitted marital asset, or (ii) a claim of a material 
change in circumstances that has arisen since the entry of the original Decree of Divorce 
thereby justifying a review of the original property division order of the District Court. 
(Record pp. 45 to 50). 
3. Whether there existed any disputed facts thereby preventing a ruling on the 
Motion of Summary Judgment in favor of the Respondent as to both cause of actions as set 
forth in the Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 111 to 113). 
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4. Whether the claims set forth in the Petition could properly be decided on a 
Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law at such an early stage of the proceedings 
and without the benefit of any discovery. (Record pp. 111 to 113). 
5. Whether the Motion for Summary Judgment was premature as a matter of law 
in that discovery in the case had not yet been undertaken as to the omitted nature of the asset 
or if there has been a substantial change in the circumstances since the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce. (NOTE: The Appellant had already filed her Initial Disclosures as well as two 
(2) Financial Declaration Forms in the hopes of expediting the disclosure of the financial 
facts regarding the case. This was done in order to minimize the cost of the proceeding for 
all parties.) (Record pp. 107 to 109, 116 to 127, 141 to 147). 
6. Whether the moving party (i.e. the Defendant/Appellee) provided an adequate 
Affidavit as to all material facts sufficient to support the Motion for Summary Judgment and 
whether the Affidavit was sufficient to counter the change in circumstances as described in 
the Affidavit filed by Ms. Foulger in opposition to the relief. (Record pp. 60 to 69). [NOTE: 
The moving party's supporting Affidavit was not made part of the record in the Third District 
Court.] (Addendum No. 5). 
B. The Standard of Review on Appeal of the District Court's Legal Rulings. 
1. When reviewing an order by the District Court granting Summary Judgment, 
the party against whom the motion has been brought against is entitled to have all the facts 
presented, and all inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered by the reviewing court in 
the light most favorable to him. Trevor Thompson v. Connie Jess 1999 UT 22, If 12,979 P.2d 
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322; Lawrence Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 123 Utah 289, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); A, 
Wayne Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). Because Summary Judgment 
is granted as a matter of law and only if the person is otherwise legally entitled to the relief 
sought, the Appellate Court is free to review de novo all of the trial court's legal conclusions 
and any related rulings thereto. Tim Themy v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc. 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1979): FrankM. Barbery. Farmers Ins. Exch. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988): A. Wavne 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
2. The Court should review the Third District Court's rulings as to the law under 
the "correction of error" standard. Malibu Investment Company v. Kathy Sparks 2000 UT 
30, f 12, 996 P.2d 1043; TRF v. Rav Felan 760 P.2d 906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); R. Owen 
Neerings v. Utah State Bar 817 P.2d 320 (Utah 1991). 
IV. DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Statutory Provisions: 
UCA §30-3-5(1) (Disposition of Property) -
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. (Balance of this portion of the statute is omitted). 
UCA §30-3-5(3) (Courts to have Continuing Jurisdiction) -
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
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V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. The Nature of the Case. 
Ms. Foulger f/k/a Mrs. Mitchell filed a Petition in the Third District Court seeking to 
either amend or modify a Decree of Divorce previously entered by the court in the fall of 
1977. (Record pp. 30 to 34; 45 to 50); (Addendum Nos. 1 and 2). The Petition was framed 
in the alternative. The Petition first sought a division of the vested private retirement benefits 
of Mr. Mitchell that had not been addressed or adjudicated in the original Decree of Divorce. 
(Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). This was an omitted asset. In the alternative, it 
was a Petition to Modify the property division provisions of the Decree of Divorce on 
account of a substantial and material change in circumstances that have arisen since the entry 
of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. (Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). 
With respect to the omitted marital asset claim, Mr. Mitchell raised the affirmative 
legal defense of res judicata in his Answer. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). The 
Appellee's legal position (when more closely examined) is both simple and direct. Mr. 
Mitchell claims that the property matters once adjudicated cannot thereafter be changed 
despite the provisions of UCA §30-3-5(3). There is no case law that supports this unique 
interpretation of the governing statute. Mr. Mitchell also failed to affirmatively declare that 
the District Court had in fact adjudicated the retirement asset in one (1) fashion or another. 
(Addendum No. 5). The record shows no reference to the asset whatsoever. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The Appellant filed the Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce in the Third District 
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Court on the 28th day of January, 2001. (Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). An 
Answer to the Petition on the merits was filed with the District Court by the Respondent on 
the 16th day of February, 2001. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). On March 14th, 
2001, the Appellee moved for Summary Judgment. (Record p. 58 to 59); (Addendum No. 
4). No discovery had been initiated by either party at the time the Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed. A Rule 26 conference had not yet been held or even scheduled by the 
parties. Ms. Foulger did file her required initial disclosures on April 25,2001. (Record pp. 
107 to 109). Mr. Mitchell failed to file any initial disclosures. Under the current Utah Civil 
Procedural Rules, formal discovery could not be undertaken at that time by either party. See 
Rule 26(d). 
The Motion to Dismiss was first heard by the Commissioner. The Commissioner 
recommended the dismissal of the Petition. (Record p. 110, 134 to 135); (Addendum No. 
8). The Petitioner filed an objection to the recommendation. (Record p. I l l ) ; (Addendum 
No. 7). The objection was then heard by Trial Judge, Bruce Lubeck, sitting in place of the 
regularly assigned Judge Anne M. Stirba. (Record p. 140). The District Court ultimately 
sustained the Commissioner's ruling and granted the Motion to Dismiss. (Record pp. 148 
to 150); (Addendum No. 9). The period of time between the filing of the Petition and the 
hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Petition was less than six (6) months. 
Ms. Foulger, in her objection to the Commissioner's ruling, raised a number of items. 
(Record pp. 111 to 113); (Addendum No.7). The objections were based upon the following 
legal grounds: 
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1. The actual failure to divide the vested private retirement benefits. (Record p. 
112); (Addendum No. 7). 
2. A claim of a substantial change in circumstances. (Record p. 112). 
3. The Motion for Summary Judgment was premature. (Record p. 112). 
4. The inadequacy of Mr. Mitchell's affidavit. (Record p. 112). 
5. No clear entitlement to an order of dismissal at that time. (Record p. 112). 
6. The inappropriateness of res judicata in the present case. (Record p. 112). 
The Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme Court on the 9th 
day of August, 2001. (Record p. 151 to 155); (Addendum No. 12). The case was then 
removed to this court by the Order of the Supreme Court under Rule 44 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
C. Statement of the Core Facts. 
The Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell was provided to the nonmoving party and it was used 
and referred to during the course of the proceedings before the District Court. It is unknown 
if the District Court actually had the pleadings before it when it was considering the matter. 
However, the Affidavit and the moving party's supporting Memorandum were not made part 
of the indexed record in the case. This disclosure is made to this court pursuant to Rule 3.3 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Addendum No. 5) 
Because this was a ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, all controlling facts 
must be considered in a light that is most favorable to the Appellant. Lawrence Morris v. 
Famsworth Motel 123 Ut. 289,259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953); Daniel English v. Albert Kienke 
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774 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). The very limited facts, as stated by Mr. Mitchell, is not 
found in the record and fails to set forth critical events. (See Addendum No. 5). The 
following are the controlling facts for purposes of this case. These facts are established in 
the trial record by the fact intensive Affidavit of the Appellant, Ms. Foulger. (Record pp. 60 
to 69); (Addendum No. 6). See also the specific facts as alleged in the Petition. (Record pp. 
45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). 
(Background Information) 
1. Ruth Foulger is 59 years of age having been born on the 26th day of June, 1942, 
in American Fork, Utah. (Foulger Aff. ^|6). 
2. The Petitioner is a bone fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
(Foulger Aff. f7). 
3. There were four (4) children born of the marriage. The children are all now 
adults. There are no children in need of any financial support. (Foulger Aff. f 8). 
4. The Petitioner is a single individual and she was not gainfully employed at the 
time the Petition to modify was filed. (Foulger Aff. Tf9). 
5. At the time of the divorce in October of 1977, the Mr. Mitchell was gainfully 
employed on a full-time basis. He was the primary provider of financial support for the 
family and his wife. (Foulger Aff. ^J10). 
(Omitted Retirement Benefits) 
6. The Petitioner's former spouse (i.e. Donald R. Mitchell) was and continues to 
be a participant in a retirement plan in which he had accrued and vested financial benefits. 
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(Foulger Aff. f l l ) . 
7. At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the court and the parties 
wholly failed to divide the retirement benefits that had accrued during the continuation of the 
marriage. (Foulger Aff. Tfl2). [See also Record pp. 1 to 34.] 
8. The Decree of Divorce is silent as to any division or the actual award of this 
specific marital asset as to either party. (Foulger Aff. <||13); (Record pp. 30 to 34); 
(Addendum No. 1). 
9. The retirement benefit was an omitted financial asset that the Third District 
Court failed to divide. (Foulger Aff. |14); (Record pp. 1 to 34). 
(Further Division of Marital Assets) 
10. The Third District Court was requested by the Petitioner to divide the 
retirement asset based upon the Petitioner's actual needs at this time. These new financial 
needs did not exist on the date of the entry of the original Decree of Divorce in late 1977. 
(Foulger Aff. |15). 
11. At the time of the entry of the original Decree of Divorce, the present 
retirement benefit was an omitted asset and was not addressed or even compromised in the 
Decree of Divorce or by any Agreement of the parties. The Petitioner has claimed a 
beneficial interest in the asset. The wife has requested that this employee benefit be 
appropriately apportioned in a fair and equitable manner. (Foulger Aff. Tfl6). 
(The Petitioner's Demonstrated Need and Changed Circumstances) 
12. The Petitioner (i.e. Ruth Foulger) is now totally disabled. She has been fully 
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disabled for the past ten (10) months at the very least (Foulger Aff. ^ 17). [NOTE: The ten 
(10) month period is referring to the point in time when the Motion for Summary Judgment 
was being considered by the Third District Court.] 
13. Prior to becoming totally disabled, the Petitioner was a licensed clinical social 
worker and was self-employed in a modest private practice. Ms. Foulger had been in 
practice for about twelve (12) years prior to the date of the filing of the Petition to modify 
the Decree of Divorce. (Foulger Aff. TJ18). 
14. The private practice has been abandoned by the time the Petition was filed 
because of the Petitioner's existing and significant medical conditions and problems. The 
private practice is no longer producing any income at this time and none is expected in the 
future. (Foulger Aff. ffi[19 and 22). 
15. The Petitioner is fully disabled and she is not gainfully employed in any 
occupation or calling whatsoever. She is dependent upon others for personal assistance and 
the government has her financial support. (Foulger Aff. ^|20). [NOTE: The wife is now 
receiving social security disability benefits and is living in a subsidized housing project.] 
16. The Petitioner is under the care and treatment of various medical doctors and 
healthcare providers for her present medical condition and the associated emotional 
problems. These conditions are severe and they appear to be permanent. A listing of at least 
twelve (12) healthcare providers for Ms. Foulger was attached to the Affidavit of the 
Petitioner. (Foulger Aff. ^|21). 
17. The Petitioner's present physical and mental disability is on account of at least 
-9-
the following medical conditions and recent events: 
1. Medical complications of both the mind and body. 
2. Strokes (many occurrences over a number of years). 
3. Heart disease and related complications due to a defect in the heart. 
4. Mental degeneration of a significant degree due in part to the strokes. 
5. Open heart surgery on November 21, 2000. 
6. A genetic blood clotting disorder which is potentially lethal. 
7. Chronic asthma. 
8. Arterial fibrillation. 
9. Chronic bronchitis. 
10. Cognitive deficits with communicative linguistic impairment (moderate 
to severe in nature) due to the various strokes. 
11. Right side body neglect due to the various strokes in recent years. 
12. Impaired vision and an impaired visual field due in part to the strokes. 
13. Depression relating to the medical conditions. 
14. Stress of a generalized nature. 
15. Additional surgery for a collapsed lung due to significant blood clotting 
on November 27, 2000. 
16. Right side body weakness which is a complicating medical condition. 
17. Lack of physical sensation on the right side of the body. 
18. Impaired mobility due to the above medical conditions. (Foulger Aff. 
122). 
18. None of the above medical conditions were known to exist at the time of the 
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2. Strokes (many occurrences over a number of years). 
3. Heart failure due to a defect in the heart. 
4. Mental degeneration of a significant degree. 
5. Open heart surgery on November 21, 2000. 
6. A genetic clotting disorder which is potentially lethal. 
7. Chronic asthma. 
8. Arterial fibrillation. 
9. Chronic bronchitis. 
10. Cognitive deficits with communicative linguistic impairment (moderate 
to severe in nature). 
11. Right side body neglect due to the various strokes. 
12. Impaired vision and an impaired visual field. 
13. Depression relating to the above conditions. 
14. Stress of a generalized nature. (Foulger Aff. Tf31). 
27. None of the present medical conditions were known to exist at the time of the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. These are material changes of circumstances which 
are of a significant degree. (Foulger Aff. 132). 
28. None of these medical conditions were foreseen nor were they foreseeable 
when the original Decree of Divorce was entered by the Third District Court. (Foulger Aff. 
133). 
VI. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court improperly granted Summary Judgment dismissing the case. 
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entry of the Decree of Divorce in 1977. (Foulger Aff. Tf23). 
(History of the Marital Asset) 
19. The parties were married to each other on October 12,1961 in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. (Foulger Aff. f24). 
20. The marriage lasted for a substantial period of time consisting of 16 years. 
(Foulger Aff. f25). 
21. On October 3, 1977, the Third District Court entered a Decree of Divorce as 
between the parties. (Foulger Aff. Tf26). 
22. The Decree of Divorce was last amended in January of 1981 and this 
amendment did not address or concern the claims set forth in the Petition and how they relate 
to her present medical condition and her demonstrated financial needs. (Foulger Aff. ^27). 
23. The Respondent has vested retirement benefits which he is now receiving from 
his former employer, Kennecott Copper Corporation. (Foulger Aff. Tf28). 
24. During the course of the marriage, Mr. Mitchell was employed and was 
covered by a retirement plan. The retirement asset is and was a marital asset. (Foulger Aff. 
1f29). 
25. The Petitioner has no vested private retirement benefits or private disability 
benefits of any kind. (Foulger Aff. TJ30). 
26. The substantial change in circumstances that have arisen in this case includes, 
but is not limited to, the following: 
1. Medical complications of the mind and body. 
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B. The District Court did not apply the correct two (2) step legal analysis when 
ruling on Mr. Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
C. The District Court improperly applied the legal doctrine of res judicata. 
D. The District Court failed to take into account the applicability of UCA §30-3-
5(3) as it relates to the established facts of this case. 
E. The District Court failed to properly consider the significant change in the 
personal and financial circumstances of Ms. Foulger that had arisen since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce in 1977. 
F. The District Court prematurely considered the Motion. The Trial Judge should 
have postponed any ruling on the Motion until after discovery had been completed. 
G. The Affidavit filed by the moving party in support of the Motion is insufficient 
to overcome the facts as stated by Ms. Foulger in her Affidavit as to the omitted status of the 
asset or the occurrence of change in circumstances since the entry of a Decree of Divorce. 
[The Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell is missing in the record as indexed, but such was actually 
received by opposing counsel.] 
VII. ARGUMENT 
The Standard of Review on a Motion for 
Summary Judgment is to Determine if There as a 
Substantial Dispute Over a Material Fact. 
The Trial Court failed to apply the correct legal standard and analysis in this case. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a moving party is entitled to 
Summary Judgment for the relief the moving party is seeking, if there is no genuine issue as 
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to any material fact, and provided the moving parly is liPiiillielVs!'! ctidilnl lo a judgment as 
a matter of law. This is a two (2) step legal process that the court must apply, 11 u »i . H n i 
legal requirement must be satisfied even if there is no dispute as to any material fact. 
TL/ivfbtY,, Ihi iii'i'in iii|j; (wirl \ iiiust also demonstrate that the party is entitled to the specific 
relief sought as a matter of law. Margaret Dooly (ilwcll v. Thomas A. Clark 658 V, Id ;iK> 
(Utah 1982) This second legal requirement means that: (i) the relit 
moving party must be proper despite the facts as asserted by the nonmoving party, and (ii) 
the \t\\\ I1. • lu applied in the case is both clear and specific, and supports the relief sought. 
Asa ycoiiitl nil .i |r,nh .lumihl s\ 11« >i I • .i inohnn loi 'Summary Judgment has been 
brought is entitled to have all facts and all reasonable inferen* t"s inn h JI i«,int? IhiTt In mi 
considered in light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lawrence Morris v. Farnsworth 
Motel Hi ill. 2XV, iy> l\2d 3) / (Utah 1953); Daniel English v. Albert Kienke 774 l\2d 
1J>1 (IHaht'l.App \{m\ 
As a general rule, the pleadings niv ,.mi iuffinnii i„!„ and , I (IHIIIMK V\ («.> i;u .L
 Ltn 
issue of fact. Joseph H. Dupler v. Maurice Yates 10 Ut.2d 251. 351 P.2d 624 (I Hali l%0) 
United American Life Insurance Co. v. Gary J. Willev 21 Ut.2d 2795 444 P.2d 755 (Utah 
19681 A party rni.in m I u Iv upon IIIC L\ 11 qj a I ions in the pleadings to counter Affidavits that 
are made from personal knowledge statin L> tails 1 kit .in; cmmais' IO i In •si*.illegal in ilu; OIIKM1 
party's pleadings. Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co. 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975 
party cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denial set forth in their pleadings in order to 
avoid Siiniiiijii y liitlgintii parts must set forth specific facts showing that there are 
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genuine issues to be resolved by the fact finder at the time of trial. Lucille J. Thornock v. 
Lois S. Cook 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Calvin N. Hall v. Perrv C. Fitzgerald 671 P.2d 224 
(Utah 1983). In response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Foulger filed a very 
detailed Affidavit as to the underlying facts of the case, (Record pp. 60 to 69); (Addendum 
No. 6). The Affidavit described a clear omission of the asset from the Decree of Divorce. 
This was not rebutted by Mr. Mitchell. Mrs. Foulger's Affidavit described important 
personal and economic facts that did not exist in 1977 when the Decree of Divorce was 
entered. 
In order for a non-moving party to successfully oppose a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, it is not necessary that the party proves its legal theory or defense. It is only 
necessary for the non-moving party to identify specific facts which controvert the facts as 
stated in the moving partyfs Affidavit. Salt Lake City Corporation v. James Constructors, 
Inc. 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
Mr. Mitchell did not set forth any lengthy history or recitation of the controlling facts 
of the case. (Addendum No. 5). He failed to state whether the retirement benefits were dealt 
with by the District Court in any fashion whatsoever. In his Answer, he merely declares (in 
Paragraph 8 thereof) that it was not a marital asset. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 
3). He failed to produce an^ facts that were contrary to those stated by the Appellant 
regarding her changed personal, financial, and medical condition since the entry of the 
Decree of Divorce. In his filed Answer, he merely glosses over the allegations in Paragraphs 
11 and 12. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No. 3). His supporting Affidavit is only eight 
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(8) brief paragraphs in length. (Addendum No \ i 1 UK \cau\)uu\ mi ibe undisputed facts 
(based upon a very abbreviated affidavit) wholly fails to address the spa if it legal ivMies 
raised in the petition of (:>k ~n omitted marital asset, or (ii) the claim of changed 
MI imi^iinavs (it .1 Mj.»ui(i(. nature and that the changes arose after the entry of the Decree 
of Divorce. These are facta >n\ \ ' s , v a ) ' the 
Trial Court after hearing the evidence. These facts cann 
nonmoving party by means of Summary Judgment as was done in this case. Ms. Foulger is 
e icts construed in a light most favorable to her. The moving party failed 
to establish dvm r\ i J i ihr II il lltr cliiiiii'i » iivumslmici'N, iis described by Ms. Foulger, are 
irrelevant to the case and that no relief in clearly prope 
clearly presents a case in which modification may be proper for two (2) reasons. 
The District Court failed to apply the proper legal standard and rules of law involving 
Sumiiiiii "i Itnli'iii nl II i. .m i inn nl Liv1., Ihat is corrected by means of an appeal. : 
Summary Judgment Should Not Be Granted by the 
Trial Court, if Discovery is Incomplete or Ongoing 
or Until a Reasonable Period has Elapsed. 
As a matter of law, the hasty ruling by the Trial Court in granting Summary Judgment 
41wl 111itl i case law, As a general rule, Summary Judgment on 
an} ~aii^ ul action should be denied i i I IVJNI pu .l|ioiiul in hi iIiNttnci") has been 
substantially completed since information sought during the course of discovery muv 111 ih: 
genuine issues of material facts sufficient to defeat a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Downtown Athletic Club v. S.M. Horman 740 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct.App. 1987). These same 
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discovered facts could also suggest that the moving party is not entitled to the relief that the 
party is seeking. The Trial Court has the power to postpone a hearing or ruling on the 
moving party's motion until each party has had a reasonable time in which to complete 
discovery. This was not done. This postponement of the matter was requested by Ms. 
Foulger, and was procedurally denied by the Trial Court. (Record pp. 76 and 88); 
(Addendum No. 7). 
There was no opportunity to conduct any discovery by the parties as it relates to the 
facts and the specific legal issues that are raised in this case. The right to conduct discovery 
was barred to each party under the Utah Civil Procedure Rules. See Rule 26(d). The facts 
and legal issues should have been developed by the parties before the District Court could 
properly render a considered ruling on the merits of the Petition. Mr. Mitchell had not filed 
any disclosures. It is clear that both the required disclosures and discovery could shed some 
light on the case and which may impact the court's two (2) step legal analysis of the case. 
The Third District Court failed to give the Appellant time to develop evidence in support of 
each separate cause of action. This was clear prejudicial error of law and should be reversed 
by this court. 
Summary Judgment Can Only Be Granted If 
Appropriate Affidavits Meeting Specific Factual 
Requirements are Filed by the Moving Party. 
The moving party's Motion and Supporting Affidavit was not sufficient to show that 
he was entitled to the dismissal of the case as a matter of law. In addition, the Motion before 
the District Court did not establish that the facts as claimed by the Appellant are wholly 
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irrelevant to the resolution <P( Mir fv »"« i > |t jiji ., inj,«i <ii .uiii'ii1. ciisccl fir llit" Petition. 
(Record pp. 58 to 59); (Addendum No. 4). The moving party's Affidavit and su|ipnriing 
Memorandum are not in the indexed record in this case. 
Whui a I" 11 ml in in I oi Summary Judgment is filed, the Affidavits of the moving party 
and the Affidavits of the mm im" HIJ! |Mil' «»us( <I < idain specific eudentiary facts w hich 
clearly indicate that there is or is not a genuine issue for trial. Graham 1 Treloggan v. Curtis 
L. Treloggan 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985), As a general rule, any witness including a party 
v i; personal knowledge of the facts can make an Affidavit as t< : .. naterial facts. 
Wesici'i. i'jKjliv.; u.UL>i.'iit i „i... t ^c in v c State Agriculture uo-Up ; ; - * < * ' L111 I(* ' * >11 
• <> Mr. Mitchell, in his Affidavit, fails to ste* u ** ; • .is in I.IU 
addressed and then describe what action the court took regarding the same. This omission 
of important evidence is important because he does state that he was familiar with the history 
M| (In cast I' "IN,, '\ff"i(l;i'\»' 'it iiieieh declares dial lie was employed with Kennecott 
Copper and that both parties were aware <if 11n oln IUIIS i Aililcmlmii Nn »i I In A Midi ml 
falls far short of stating what, if any, thing was said or done about the vested pri\ ate 
retirement benefits. If they had been addressed, then he could have stated what was done. 
Thr O l i ••* H ' . M *,i • .in "> M'UM'uJ Xvsef . . •• 
In this case, the Affidavit of Mr, Mikhd l doiM, nol .uKlrc^s (in; iniporliinl .illemsihu-
legal cause of action raised in the case of a material change in circumstances. (Record pi 
to •* MI u> (>9); (Addendum Nos. 2 and 6). Mr. Mitchell's Affidavit does not disclose facts 
"Hi,i) ( "M»ve thai the »vlirt (n ihc lorm of dismissal) on this specific claim was proper as a 
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matter of law. The filed Affidavit of Mr. Mitchell fails to even address the claim of a 
material change in circumstances since the entry of the Decree of Divorce let alone dispute 
it. (Addendum No. 5). The Affidavit fails to identify facts that clearly demonstrate that the 
modification authority of the court under UCA §30-3-5(3) is wholly unwarranted in this case 
both legally and factually. The Affidavit fails to describe how that the retirement benefits 
were before the court and how they were addressed by the court in its Decree of Divorce or 
in its Findings of Facts. (Record pp. 27 to 29). 
Assets and Income Streams Acquired 
During a Marriage can be Divided and Even 
Modified by the District Court. 
It is acknowledged that marriage is properly viewed as the pooling of the resources 
of the couple. Estate of Gorrel 740 P. 2d 267 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
When the parties seek a divorce, then the assets and liabilities of the marriage must 
be fairly divided by the Trial Court. David L. Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). There is no set formula for dividing property other than the general 
proposition that all divisions must be fair, equitable, and reasonably necessary for the 
protection and the support of the parties. UCA §30-3-5(1); Joel H. Izatt v. Mary C. Izatt 627 
P.2d49 (Utah 1981): Margaret Fletcher v. William I. Fletcher 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
The courts have recognized that the division of assets and debts need not be equal. Helen 
Narango v. Jose L. Narango 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) (specifically holding that 
separate premarital property can be divided and even awarded to the other party for good 
cause shown). The Utah supreme Court has also declared that premarital property or 
-19-
separate property may be divided between flic piiMio- >* In "f I'V linis of ihe case warrant 
such relief Joel H. Izatt v. Marv C. Izatt 627 P.2d 49 (Utah 1981); KathrynM. NewN lever 
v. Teddy P. NewMeyer 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1997) (holding that premarital or separate assets 
jiov bv .tn.inial I" llvr oilin ',|'nnsc): Helen Burke v. Edward Burke 73? P.2d 133 (Utah 
1987) (holding that separate assets and inhe i ? t - ie facts of the case 
warrant such action). 
The courts have declared that there must be a reasonable, objective, and systematic 
di\ "Mon i»l tlii: |»h»pun it nil was accumulated during the marriage. David Burt v. Betty Burt 
799 P.2d 1166 (Utah C( \ p| i - . assets may loose its identity 
as such if the other spouse adds to its value ur protects I imcl "it ml \\ n\). 
The courts have long held that a marital asset is determined by the existence ot a 
nidiilull relationship and not by whose name appears on the asset as being the legal or 
beneficial title OVMRT iiinl'1'" "-uk"1 or lo'l'/nil1 I m Kellie K. Jackson v. Mark Allen Jackson 
617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (holding that title He 
court can order a change in the title or the ownership of assets if the case warrants ilic SH"M ;) 
jurts have declared that when dividing the assets and the liabilities of the 
marriage . = se becomes" a public charge". David L. 
Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 ("I Jtah ("I \ \ <"f i I' W " i 
The retirement benefits that accrued during the seventeen (17) \vm mania,!,?!1 ,ur 
marilitl assets by legal definition. They are also subject to division and to later modification 
lor C:I«ISC Jiowit ("liiMuii" U llu p u l s i o n s ul I ll A §§30-3-5(1) and (3). This continuing 
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authority of the court includes the ability to apportion assets that are separate or even 
premarital in nature in appropriate circumstances. 
The Trial Court is Required to Divide 
All of the Assets of the Marriage. 
One of the legal claims that was asserted in the Petition of Ms. Foulger is that the 
Third District Court failed to divide all of the assets of the marriage. (Record pp. 45 to 50); 
(Addendum No. 2). The court did not identify, let alone divide, the husband's retirement 
benefits. (Record pp. 1 to 34). They are not even mentioned in the District Court record 
leading up to the entry of the Decree of Divorce. This was a mistake that arose during the 
course the original divorce proceeding. (Record pp. 30 to 34); (Addendum No. 1). The 
provisions of UCA §30-3-5(1) provides and even mandates that a Trial Court must divide all 
of the assets and obligations of the marriage. This is an affirmative obligation imposed 
initially upon the Trial Court. This statutory duty clearly existed in October of 1977. The 
requirement of a division does not mean that each spouse must be awarded a specific portion 
of each existing asset. What the statute and the case law requires is that all of the assets (both 
marital and separate) be identified and then awarded to either or to both parties in some 
identified, objective, and systematic fashion. The court cannot fail to discharge its statutory 
duty and fail to address all of the assets of the marriage in one fashion or the other. Failure 
to do so constitutes an omission of the item from the provisions of the Decree of Divorce. 
(Record pp. 45 to 50); (Addendum No. 2). It does not matter whether or not it was the 
parties or the court that was responsible for the omission. Laura Thompson v. Brent 
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (noting that a marital debt in the form of a car loan was 
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not addressed in the original Decree of Divorce nn<l llus omission inslilied ;i modification of 
the Decree even though the parties were fully aware of the debt when the Deere* • i > I' I > i \ • ive 
was actually entered). When faced with an error or omission, the party may seek relief from 
ii i iiiiliii Rule v I mi In mi independent action as was done in this case. 
An independent action : nas occurred, but for 
which a motion to correct the error is time barred. Gary Egan v. Nancy I'igan :MV() I* ,M , 01 
(Utah 1977) (a case involving a claim on non-paternity that arose more than six (6) months 
al'hi llic iJectTi" ol Divorce was entered). 
This statutoi \ iliii i ,m<l JIHIKII M \ ut ijri n\c assus and debts have existed under Utah 
state law in substantially the same form for many \eat> h»i cs.mipli i MIIIUII i fun m 
was contained in UCA §40-3-5(1943). The Utah courts have long declared that this specific 
statute allows a court to review family law matters not only at the time of divorce itself but 
also .ii ;i I.Her clad1 upon slims UIL1 ul a siikslanlial change in circumstances. RuthM. Dixon 
v. William D. Dixon 121 Ul 2595 240 P ,\i i " I 11 1 ' - " | > \ >« n inc asset was 
adequately addressed in the original pleadings and was not a mistake or 
the Decree of Divorce as it relates to property matters is still subject to additional review 
upon ptoi »('<)(" a siihslmilh.il Jinnee in circumstances. I JC A §30-3-5(3); Laura Thompson v. 
Brent Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985). 
This court has decreed that where the record and the decree is without :mv reference 
io (he change circumstances as claimed in the Petition, then it is axiomatic that the events 
n ere u i < iiilcmpl.iled ai line UHR: ul the entry ofthe original Decree ofDivorce. Frances R. 
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Bolliger v. Ronald E. Bolliger 2000 Utah Ct.App. 47, Tfl3, 997 P.2d 903. 
The entire record leading up to the entry of the Decree of Divorce is but 34 pages in 
length. It is clear that none of the cited conditions of Ms. Foulger are noted to exist or even 
alluded to in the record up to this time. These facts are not even disputed by Mr. Mitchell 
in his Affidavit. (Addendum No. 5). 
The Affidavit of Ruth Foulger clearly describes significant facts that did not exist 
when the divorce was originally granted. (Record pp. 60 to 69). These facts were not 
materially contested by Mr. Mitchell in his Affidavit. (Addendum Nos. 5 and 6). These 
facts, as set forth in Mrs. Foulger's Affidavit, were to be taken by the court as proven at least 
for purposes of the Motion. These asserted facts clearly justify a review of the property 
issues as to whether or not the asset was omitted. At the very least, it sets forth a prima facie 
case of a material change in circumstances. It does not compel the court to grant a 
modification of the Decree of Divorce. However, the asserted facts are clearly sufficient to 
withstand the granting of a Summary Judgment Motion. 
A careful review of the District Court's record leading up to the entry of a Decree of 
Divorce will also reveal that the retirement asset was not even identified in the indexed 
record let alone addressed by the court in its Findings of Fact or the Decree of Divorce. 
(Record pp. 1 to 34); (Addendum No. 1). 
Res Judicata is Not a Total and 
Complete Defense to a Modification Proceeding 
Based Upon a Substantial Change in Circumstances. 
The common law doctrine of res judicata applies to all divorce actions. Dallas 
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Jacobsen v. Mary Jacobsen 703 P.2d 303 (I "lali IW^M'irpl'i Hu' UUIUIHUI law legal doctrine 
in the absence of a change in circumstances). 
ourt ultimately ruled that Mr. Mitchell' s retirement benefits that 
accrued durim , •• » , res judicata. (Record pp. 134 to 135); 
(Addendum Nos. 8 and 9). However, the record is i,"k\n lhal Hie ivlih menl asul h<i<l not 
been addressed at all in the Decree of Divorce. (Record pp. 1 to 34). liven if n had IM vii 
addressed, then it is still subject to a modification for good cause shown. UCA §30-3-5(3); 
Ruth M. Dixon v. William R. Dixon I J! I t U. J>(), 240 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952). The ruling 
of the District < nun ivh'»|i\ (MI UTIU<J "in1 presentation of the facts at trial establishing that 
the retirement asset was never adjudicated or lhal Ilk1 mpmed 'Yause show n is present (fins 
warranting a modification. 
1 improperly applied a very strict interpretation of res judicata that is not 
warranted under»ixi st in p ease law anil i i li*>hl <>! (In clear language of the statute. . 
UCA §30-3-5 has long been interpreted b\ Hi* \ nml ^ in irlas i m ilir i as* ml di\ <»rce 
or family law proceedings), the common law rules which are used to maintain the sain I il v 
judgments and decrees. Cora B. Hamilton v. Nathaniel M. Hamilton 
89 Ut. 554,58P.2d 11 (Utah 19361 I lu r \ n plum (u Hie yuienil ruk- IN based upon the legal 
premise that a substantial change in circumstances justifies a review of th« 
court. Belle Codv v. J. J. Codv 47 Ut 456,154 P. 952 (Utah 1916): Sheila Land v. William 
Land II( )S |> 'M | ' | l< (I Had 1 YM < u Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990). 
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The courts have declared that the legislature in adopting this statutory provision 
intended to, and in fact did, enlarge the common law powers of the court regarding divorce 
actions. This is a very clear declaration of public policy that overrides the common law. 
This important public policy has long recognized that with the passage of time, even those 
matters previously addressed by the courts in a Decree of Divorce may, because of new 
developments, need to be reexamined and may be modified if the facts warrant such action. 
For nearly a century, orders respecting the disposition of property have been held to be 
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court and may be modified upon proof of a 
significant change in either personal or financial circumstances. Charles A. Doe v. Elfa L. 
Doe 48 Ut. 200, 158 P. 781 (Utah 1916); Ruth M. Dixon v. William D. Dixon 121 Ut. 259, 
240 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1952). The courts have also declared that the omission of an important 
matter may itself constitute a significant change in circumstances. Laura Thompson v. Brent 
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985); Gary Egan v. Nancy Egan 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977) 
(holding that a mistake is sufficient to challenge the appropriat eness of the original Order and 
seek its modification). 
Even in cases where property has been subject to division by an agreement or a 
stipulation of the parties and which was specifically sanctioned by the trial court, these 
agreements can be modified at a later date upon showing of good cause. Heidemarie G. 
Foulger v. John C. Foulger 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981) (stating that an agreement to divide 
property is subject to modification upon proof of a substantial change in circumstances); 
Sheila Land v. William Land 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah Ct.App. 1980) (acknowledging that 
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voluntary property settleme modification for proper cause 
shown); Lvnette Kinsman v. John Lee Kinsman 748 P.2d '"Id (Miali Ct.App I'JXX) 
(modifying a prior negotiated settlement agreement based upon a change in circumstances); 
Robert (j. Nay lor v. Julia Lee Nay lor i\ - Utah 1985) (modification of the Decree 
is allowed based upon the provi » ^ I. 
Mr. Mitchell contends that until the Supreme Court's Woodward dm-simi was 
rendered there was no equitable interest a wife could make in the retirement assets of the 
other spouse. Marvin L. Woodward v. Mildred L. W oodward 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982). 
This proposition is not supported by the nm lin < w .i l.i \ ili.il \\\ Inn \ w hal constitutes the 
"marital estate". Kellie K. Jackson v. Mark Allen Jackson 617 P.2d 338 (i italu I %"!) i 11 
addition, the fact that the court later decrees that a particular ruling on a given topic has 
prospective diet I simply means that it would be proper to apply the rule of law in all later 
matters or proceedings (11»11111 \ > I H ^ (111 i 11 I L v. 11 \ i M J 11 \ prospective ruling by a court; 
does not always mean the law was clearly to the contran 
ruling in question. In any event, the Modification Petition was filed after the prospective 
i nl in;. , I'd led upon by the Appellee was issued. It is clear that under Utah case law private 
retirement benefits ,n uittnibfi ** *(IIII(IJ" Mir i u t tugr ait marital assets,, The authority to 
divide them was created by statute. UCA §30-3-5= In tlenl, ;ill jssets ill ii ihe panics fun . 
be they marital or separate, is subject to adjustment or modification for good cause shown 
in 11 iTivota.* ease, 
i*. i dail K. Ihrockmorton v. Cecil D. 
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Throckmorton 767 P.2d 121 (Utah Ct.App. 1988) also relied upon by the Appellee. In that 
case, the claimed change in circumstances was based upon a supposed change in the law. 
The Court of Appeals merely decreed that a change in the law standing alone is not sufficient 
to constitute a change in circumstances within the meaning of the statute. The present case 
is clearly factually different than the Throckmorton case. In the present case, the 
modification request is based upon two (2) alternative legal theories. The first theory is that 
the asset was never addressed in the original proceed. The second theory is the existence of 
a very significant and life altering changes in the former wife's actual needs, physical and 
mental health, and her existing earning abilities. This is exactly what UCA §30-3-5(3) 
contemplates when it authorizes a court to review anew divorce orders when the facts in the 
case are significantly different. 
The common law recognizes that when the facts have significantly changed, then the 
common law doctrine of res judicata is not to be applied. The doctrine of res judicata has no 
application where either: (i) the cause of action, or (ii) the issues involved in the subsequent 
proceedings are not identical to those raised in the prior proceedings. See Am. Jur.2d 
Judgments, §404 and §415. The doctrine cannot be applied when a different case is 
presented which does not arise out of the very same set of facts as the prior decided case. 
Searle Brothers, v. Edlean Searle 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978); International Resources v. C. 
Robert Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979); David Winters v. Joanne Schulman 1999 Utah 
Ct.App. 119, Tfl3, 977 P.2d 1218 (applying the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel). 
For example, prior rulings in a continuing case can be re-opened in nondomestic civil 
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cases, if certa ,, n^ State Bank v. Annie Cruz 95 lit, 320, 81 P.2d 
359 (Utah 1938); Archie Thurston v. Box Elder County W? V M 11! i<( ,|! K.ilm I 'i r. i, I (icse 
conditions are: (i) an intervening change in the law, (ii) when new evidence has bee .we 
available, anu wnen tne court is convinced the prior decision is clearly erroneous and 
would work ^ i Shirley Gillmor v. Dennis K. Wright 850 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1993). 
Mr. Mitchell vigorously declares that the Woodward case is new law. II " n 11 i 11"*. 
then the Woodard case would clearly represent a signficant change in the law as to the 
tiraliiiciil of (he iilireiiintl benefits. Marvin L. Woodward v. Mildred L. Woodward 656 
P M \\\ 1111, ili I '""K " I his i dirjiliidi \ .in Intervening change in the law. Therefore, res 
judicata is not a proper defer proceeding is a new 
cause of action under UCA §30-3-5(3) that is based on new facts or sipin Ik .nil i\ "Jiffei eniv 
facts For these two (2) reasons, the legal defense of res judicata is not proper in this case. 
T - t significant legal issue, The Trial Court missed this important distinction 
in the decided c «.M and Ilk \n\\vimny staltik" 1 In: ruling of the Trial t ourt represents 
a substantial deviation from the long established law and a 11 c \ i i 111 <) 11 (i <»111 (11 •" r - T • • 111 • I \\ < 
law that implements the statute regarding the continuing legal and equitable authority of the 
:djust property divisions for good cause shown. The current ruling, if it is 
allowed to stand, does in deal nuke Mi'» I1 "iiljyi "j [nihil,,, charge ' which is contrary to the 
declared public policy of this state. 
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Res Judicata Bars Domestic Modification Proceedings 
Only When the Petition Cannot Establish a Substantial 
Change in Circumstances or the Existence of a Mistake of Fact. 
The Appellee claims the Petition is barred from any type of relief by reason of the 
common law doctrine of res judicata. (Record pp. 54 to 57); (Addendum No 3). The Trial 
Court ultimately adopted this legal conclusion. (Record p.134 to 135; 148 to 150); 
(Addendum Nos. 8 and 9). The District Court's legal ruling is erroneous. 
As a general rule, the common law doctrine of res judicata puts at rest legal disputes 
which have been fully addressed in a prior proceeding on the merits. However, when there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances or where there has been a mistake of fact, 
then res judicata does not apply in a domestic law proceeding. Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. 
Smith 793 P.2d 407(Utah Ct.App. 1990) (holding that a mistake of fact is sufficient to reject 
the strict application of res judicata); Monte McLane v. B.A. McLane 570 P.2d 692 (Utah 
1977) (rejecting a res judicata defense if a change in circumstances has arisen); Betty L. 
Kessimakis v. Dale M. Kessimakis 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978) (rejecting ares judicata claim 
where there has been a change in circumstances); Laura Thompson v. Brent Thompson 709 
P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (holding that the omission of a marital obligation justifies a 
modification of the decree even though the parties were fully aware of the important facts). 
Gary Egan v. Nancy Egan 560 P.2d 704 (Utah 1977) (holding that the issue of paternity 
could properly be reviewed a second time by means of an independent action). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has clearly held that where there has been a mistake of 
fact, then res judicata will not be applied. Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407 
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(Utah Ct.App. 1990); David L. Canning v. Caleen S. Canning 744 P.2d 325 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
A property division order can be modified where there has been a substantial change 
in circumstances. Laura Thompson v. Brent Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that the omission of a matter in the original divorce action can be the basis for a change in 
the Decree of Divorce based upon changed circumstances). 
The courts have long recognized that because family law matters are equitable in 
nature, the application of the legal doctrine of res judicata is relaxed because the court has 
continuing statutory jurisdiction over all family law matters. Laura Thompson v. Brent 
Thompson 709 P.2d 360 (Utah 1985); Patricia G. Smith v. Scott G. Smith 793 P.2d 407 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
A Decree of Divorce which is wholly void of any reference to a matter and where the 
record in the case is wholly lacking of an adjudication of a major marital asset, then res 
judicata should not be strictly applied. The record clearly demonstrates that there has been 
an omission of a significant asset from the original Decree of Divorce or at least a substantial 
change in circumstances which was not foreseen at the time of the entry of the Decree of 
Divorce. Frances R. Bolliger v. Ronald E. Bolliger 2000 Utah Ct.App. 47, ^[13, 997 P.2d 
903. (Record pp. l to34). 
In this case, the parties have failed by mistake or oversight to adjudicate the marital 
retirement asset. This is a classic case of a mutual mistake. Mr. Mitchell, in his own 
affidavit, fails to provide to the court any additional evidence that the court did in fact 
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address the asset in some fashion. The ruling of the Trial Court should be reversed. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
1. The trial court incorrectly applied the wrong legal standard and failed to engage 
in a two (2) step legal analysis of the Motion for Summary Judgment. (Record pp. 134 to 
135). 
2. The Trial Court failed to give the parties a reasonable amount of time to 
conduct discovery and which is prejudicial error. (Record pp. 76 and 88). 
3. The court improperly applied res judicata to the case both contrary to the 
common law and in derogation of the statutory right to the court to modify the prior orders 
of the court for cause shown. 
4. The Trial Court failed to address the changed circumstances and that the 
Petitioner has presented a prima facie case of modification under UCA §30-3-5. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR 
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RUTH LEILA MITCHELL, : NOTICE OF APPEAL 
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Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Commissioner Thomas N. Amett 
vs. 
DONALD R. MITCHELL, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
oooOooo 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES; 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, by and through her attorney of record, W. Kevin Jackson, 
and hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court of the State of Utah (subject to reassignment) from 
the final judgment entered by the Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in the 
above entitled matter and dated the 1st day of August, 2001. A copy of said Order granting the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and overruling the filed Objections and Dismissal of 
the Petition to Modify is attached hereto. The final Order dismissed the Petition for Modification. 
000057 
The Appellant hereby tenders the required appeal fees and costs. 
The parties to the judgment which is appealed from and the names and the addresses of 
their respective attorneys of record are as follows: 
NO. 
1 
NAME OF PARTY 
Donald R. Mitchell 
ATTORNEY FOR PARTY 
Douglas T. Hall 
LEGAL ADDRESS 
4885 South 900 East #208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
This notice of appeal is filed pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DATED this ffv^day of August, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to the 
following: 
Douglas T. Hall, Esq. 
4885 South 900 East #208 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117-5793 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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DONALD R. MITCHELL. 
Defendant/Respondent. 
| ORDER AFFIRMING 
| COMMISSIONER'S 
| RECOMMENDATION 
| Case No. D^m^^Jl'H^^^ 
| Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
| Commissioner Thomas N. Amett, Jr. 
Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation granting the 
Respondent's motion for a summary judgment came on regularly for hearing on July 17 , 
2001, the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding. The Petitioner was present with her 
attorney, W. Kevin Jackson. The Respondent was present with his attorney, Douglas T. Hall. 
Counsel for both parties presented oral argument. The Court, having heard the argument of 
counsel, having reviewed the file and the documents and exhibits therein, and now, being duly 
apprised in the premises and good cause appearing therefore, makes and enters the following 
ORDER 
1. The Commissioner for Domestic Relations correctly determined that the Utah 
Court of Appeals rulings in the cases of Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121 (Utah 
App. 1988), and Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah App. 1990), are controlling in the 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
Deputy ClerK 
. 1 - nnnnKQ 
instant case: as is the doctrine of res judicata as it applies to the undisputed material facts in 
this case. 
2. The Commissioner ruled correctly that a new category of property rights is not 
itself sufficient to establish a substantial change of circumstances. 
3. The Commissioner was correct in recommending that, as a matter of law, the 
Respondent was entitled to a summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's petitioner to 
modify the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Petitioner's objection to the Commissioner's recommendation is overruled and the 
Order of Summary Judgment, heretofore entered, is affirmed. 
DATED this \ s day of / fl/^/i > / 2001. 
BY T H E ^ Q J ^ ^ ^ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
BRUCE 
District 
W^tfeteji Jackson / 
Attorney^ for Petitioner 
.-). nnnnfin 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
first class postage pre-paid, this /^H* day of July, 2001, to the following: 
W. Kevin Jackson 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
311 South State Street, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2379 
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